The second book review of "Dudus: The Extradition of Jamaica's #1 Drug Don" was by Allan Douglas published in The Jamaica Observer, Monday, October 01, 2018 entitled 'The extradition of Dudus':
"I have just finished reading Dr Paul Ashley's book, Dudus: The Extradition of Jamaica's #1 Drug Don, a seven-chapter, 176-page scholarly work recording a significant event in Jamaica's history. It is very unfortunate the book will not be available for sale at bookstores or other outlets, but will only be accessible from libraries.
In my opinion, the author could have spent more time researching the main character, Christopher “Dudus” Coke, and providing more details about him. To understand this character properly he must be placed in context. The book needed greater elaboration of his personal life — his boyhood days, the loves and influences that made him the person he became. One was left to rely on American intelligence reports that lacked substance and evidential material.
This book has left me sympathetic to then Bruce Golding-led Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) Administration's reluctance to sign the extradition warrant. There is no way any Government should have signed any warrant for extradition of one of its nationals, regardless of how despicable a character that person is alleged to be.
Throughout Dr Ashley's book I got the impression that the US authorities had little or no regard or respect for the Golding Administration or, for that matter, protocol and the laws of Jamaica. Based on the copies of documents reproduced in this book, I believe the US authorities were of the opinion that because Dudus was alleged to supported the JLP, a JLP Administration would not acquiesce easily to its request and, accordingly, the Americans sought to revert to the “divide and conquer” principle. This principle involves playing on the “natives'” weakness of sense of importance, and flattering those with the muscle (security forces) to help its sinister efforts to extradite this drug don to the US.
Two camps were created in this extradition exercise. On the one hand were the US authorities, along with the two heads of the Jamaica security forces; and on the other was the Golding Administration. Both heads of our security forces probably would have been sympathetic to the US authorities' view that Dudus was a supporter of the JLP and then Prime Minister Golding, and therefore the latter was not going to be eager to sign the extradition warrant. They [heads of the security forces] no doubt were probably influenced further by the then attorney general's stance or by what they probably perceived as delaying tactics in signing an arrest warrant for extradition.
Were these two gentlemen disloyal? Did they conspire with the US authorities? I think that to better determine the answer to those questions one has to determine these two officers' mindset. Their loyalty was certainly to the Constitution of Jamaica, and if the duly elected Government of Jamaica was in any way disregarding it, surely they had a duty to act — even with a foreign power — to prevent that Government's efforts from undermining the constitution? This is, of course, the classic reason given by coup leaders for overthrowing lawfully elected governments. In view of their respective positions, did they not have a duty to report to the head of state, the governor general, or, for that matter, resign? Did the US authorities in Jamaica not understand that they could easily, albeit unwittingly, set up and entice these two most powerful men in overthrowing their Government?
This book deals with the balance of what information should be made available to the public versus what is in the national interest. In this regard, it is obvious the rulings made not to disclose the Jamaica Defence Force's operational orders for the Tivoli operation were made without good reason and that the truth and Jamaica were served a huge blow. The arguments by the Independent Commission of Investigations for the release of these orders were compelling, but national security interests prevailed. It is a mystery why an operational military order (classified or not) made for an operation in 2010, and no longer pending or in progress, could not have been made available to the commissioners in the enquiry. We will never know just where this military operation that cost the innocent lives of over 60 Jamaicans went awfully wrong. Or at what level did it all go so miserably and tragically wrong?
I have contended before that the manner in which the commission of enquiry into the 2010 Tivoli operation was conducted has deprived us of transparency and the truth. What we had at the enquiry was an adversarial approach to an inquiry, instead of an inquisitorial one. The lawyers were the only winners, while Jamaica and the truth were the losers
Dr Ashley must be commended for his efforts in producing this book. Hopefully it will encourage others to dig deeper to produce other accounts of this very important, albeit tragic, piece of our country's history.
Colonel Allan Douglas is a retired officer of the Jamaica Defence Force. Send comments to the Observer or alldouglas@aol.com."
"I have just finished reading Dr Paul Ashley's book, Dudus: The Extradition of Jamaica's #1 Drug Don, a seven-chapter, 176-page scholarly work recording a significant event in Jamaica's history. It is very unfortunate the book will not be available for sale at bookstores or other outlets, but will only be accessible from libraries.
In my opinion, the author could have spent more time researching the main character, Christopher “Dudus” Coke, and providing more details about him. To understand this character properly he must be placed in context. The book needed greater elaboration of his personal life — his boyhood days, the loves and influences that made him the person he became. One was left to rely on American intelligence reports that lacked substance and evidential material.
This book has left me sympathetic to then Bruce Golding-led Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) Administration's reluctance to sign the extradition warrant. There is no way any Government should have signed any warrant for extradition of one of its nationals, regardless of how despicable a character that person is alleged to be.
Throughout Dr Ashley's book I got the impression that the US authorities had little or no regard or respect for the Golding Administration or, for that matter, protocol and the laws of Jamaica. Based on the copies of documents reproduced in this book, I believe the US authorities were of the opinion that because Dudus was alleged to supported the JLP, a JLP Administration would not acquiesce easily to its request and, accordingly, the Americans sought to revert to the “divide and conquer” principle. This principle involves playing on the “natives'” weakness of sense of importance, and flattering those with the muscle (security forces) to help its sinister efforts to extradite this drug don to the US.
Two camps were created in this extradition exercise. On the one hand were the US authorities, along with the two heads of the Jamaica security forces; and on the other was the Golding Administration. Both heads of our security forces probably would have been sympathetic to the US authorities' view that Dudus was a supporter of the JLP and then Prime Minister Golding, and therefore the latter was not going to be eager to sign the extradition warrant. They [heads of the security forces] no doubt were probably influenced further by the then attorney general's stance or by what they probably perceived as delaying tactics in signing an arrest warrant for extradition.
Were these two gentlemen disloyal? Did they conspire with the US authorities? I think that to better determine the answer to those questions one has to determine these two officers' mindset. Their loyalty was certainly to the Constitution of Jamaica, and if the duly elected Government of Jamaica was in any way disregarding it, surely they had a duty to act — even with a foreign power — to prevent that Government's efforts from undermining the constitution? This is, of course, the classic reason given by coup leaders for overthrowing lawfully elected governments. In view of their respective positions, did they not have a duty to report to the head of state, the governor general, or, for that matter, resign? Did the US authorities in Jamaica not understand that they could easily, albeit unwittingly, set up and entice these two most powerful men in overthrowing their Government?
This book deals with the balance of what information should be made available to the public versus what is in the national interest. In this regard, it is obvious the rulings made not to disclose the Jamaica Defence Force's operational orders for the Tivoli operation were made without good reason and that the truth and Jamaica were served a huge blow. The arguments by the Independent Commission of Investigations for the release of these orders were compelling, but national security interests prevailed. It is a mystery why an operational military order (classified or not) made for an operation in 2010, and no longer pending or in progress, could not have been made available to the commissioners in the enquiry. We will never know just where this military operation that cost the innocent lives of over 60 Jamaicans went awfully wrong. Or at what level did it all go so miserably and tragically wrong?
I have contended before that the manner in which the commission of enquiry into the 2010 Tivoli operation was conducted has deprived us of transparency and the truth. What we had at the enquiry was an adversarial approach to an inquiry, instead of an inquisitorial one. The lawyers were the only winners, while Jamaica and the truth were the losers
Dr Ashley must be commended for his efforts in producing this book. Hopefully it will encourage others to dig deeper to produce other accounts of this very important, albeit tragic, piece of our country's history.
Colonel Allan Douglas is a retired officer of the Jamaica Defence Force. Send comments to the Observer or alldouglas@aol.com."
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